One of the specific characteristics of Austrian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
. Since FDI refers to a capital flow or stock, we use "direct FDI" synonymously for Austrian-owned firms and "indirect FDI" for foreign-owned affiliates in Austria. ******** Figure 1 ******** Figure 1 illustrates the term "indirect FDI". Therefore, three different geographical entities are distinguished. In principle, all three should be included in the analysis, since the relation between Austria and the CEECs also depends on the activities of the MNEs in "the rest of the world". Since our focus is on the domestic employment effects this conceptual model can be applied to direct FDI by looking at the relationship between the Austrian parent and its affiliate in the CEECs. For indirect FDI the relationship between the Austrian firm and its affiliates in CEECs is also affected by the activities of the foreign MNE in the "the rest of the world" (dashed arrows in Figure 1 ). The activities of the parent company and other affiliates of the MNE are the main cause for different trade patterns of direct and indirect FDI.
Stylised facts on Austrian FDI in CEECs show at least three particular structural features with respect to the question of employment and trade effects of FDI which make Austria an ideal country to be studied.
First, Austrian firms have been early investors. Austrian FDI in CEECs have reached high levels immediately after 1989. Austria's share in FDI stocks ranges from 3 to 22 per cent in neighbouring CEECs and it is an important location (bridgehead) for regional headquarters responsible for CEECs (cf. Table 1 ). The large share also stimulated (public) concern about job losses through relocation. 1 Although at first glance this may seem as a contradiction in terms it is nevertheless very important. Stankovsky, 1999, p. 117 .
Second, Austrian investors in CEECs are only partly Austrian firms, as Austrian affiliates of
foreign MNEs account for a large share of Austria's overall FDI in CEECs. "A great deal of Austria's FDI abroad is in fact carried out by enterprises which are in turn affiliates of foreign investors" (Neudorfer, 1997, p. 56) . During the period 1989-91 this type of investment had come to about 40% in CEECs. Despite this share decreased to 26% in 1996, it remains an important part of Austria's overall
FDI in CEECs.
Third, during the early investment period , direct FDI achieved better outcomes in employment growth as well as sales growth of the parent firms in Austria than indirect FDI. This result holds true even for the post-investment period . Sales growth of direct FDI has been considerably stronger for both periods. In accordance with sales growth, parent employment of direct FDI has grown considerably stronger than for indirect FDI. These stylised facts give rise to a number of questions, in particular concerning (labour-)cost related relocations given the large gap of labour cost between "East and West". In particular, we are interested in possible links between the domestic employment performance and FDI in CEECs. The reorganisation of production triggered off by the opening of Eastern Europe has brought new interest to questions of employment relocation and the impact of FDI on the balance of payments. While the public discussion in home countries is based on fears of workers in marginalised industries and of politicians in regions with high unemployment, evidence on the substitution of jobs by FDI in CEECs is still rare. A separation of the total employment effect of both groups of firms should yield important insights which help to explain the stylised facts presented above on the basis of the underlying motives and the trade structures that exist between parent and affiliate. Consequently this paper distinguishes between direct and indirect FDI and tests hypotheses concerning the links between domestic employment and job creation abroad.
The paper is organised as follows: First, the existing literature on domestic employment effects of outward FDI is surveyed briefly with respect to motives and trade. Then the data and the methodology are described and the results are presented. The results point to the importance of the distinction of direct and indirect FDI, concerning the sales and trade structure as well as the motives for FDI in explaining different home-country employment effects of the two groups of firms. There is a short concluding section on the micro-economic logic of the aggregated results derived in this paper.
II. Literature Review
The question whether outward FDI substitutes or complements domestic production and consequently jobs, has been the subject of a large number of studies (e.g. Lipsey and Weiss 1981; Lipsey 1994; Graham 1996; Barrell and Pain 1997) . Blomström et al. (1997 ), Agarwal (1996 and Andersen and Hainaut (1998) provide excellent surveys. One way to approach the problem is to derive substitution elasticities (relative wages) between employees in parent firms and their affiliates. Since this road of investigation is not open to us, because of the lack of firm-specific data on wage levels in CEECs by industry, we focus our analysis on trade relations between parent firms and affiliates. Trade and FDI are linked in multiple ways (see Gray 1992; Cantwell 1994) . According to this strand of argument, the intra-firm trade balance, the geographical distribution of exports and the importance of local sales are important determinants of the demand for labour at home resulting from outward FDI. Most empirical studies, however, lack information about these important indicators. Consequently, the argument here is based on the relationship between the motives for FDI and their effect on trade (cf. Agarwal 1996) and on the intra-firm trade relations.
According to established theory, the activities of affiliates can be related to the motives of FDI, namely efficiency seeking, market seeking and strategic-asset seeking. Austrian market supply and sometimes associated exports to CEECs. The specific competence of Austrian firms (direct FDI) arises from their long-lasting experience in CEEC markets (Bellak 1997 (Bellak , 1998 . Empirically, if different trade linkages between parent firms and affiliates exist for direct and indirect FDI, their effect on domestic employment will differ as well. For example Blomström et al. (1997) argue, that rivalry for markets is one of the main reasons for a positive relationship between foreign production and domestic employment (p. 1798), which provides one argument to distinguish market-oriented from efficiency-oriented FDI.
A related question is, whether the trade linkages change from the period of entry into a foreign market and the maturing of the FDI. Several theories suggest that entry occurs first via a sales subsidiary, which may be extended into a production unit later on (e.g. Bergsten et al. 1978 This is mainly the result of different investment patterns during the early 1990s and thereafter. At the beginning of the economic integration between Austria and her adjacent Eastern European neighbours many small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) used their first-mover advantages which can be attributed to long lasting historical and cultural ties (Altzinger and Winklhofer 1998; Schröter 1994 ).
However, due to weak financial capabilities of these firms capital per investment has been rather small.
After this initial period the integration process has proceeded rather quick and the economic stabilisation of the transition countries has improved. These changes have attracted even some very large investments of Austrian firms. Therefore the amount of capital invested has increased from ATS 27 million in 1991 to ATS 43 million in 1996 and in 1996 the amount of capital per investment does not differ any longer between direct and indirect FDI. Another reason may be the cumulative learning processes of early movers (Porter 1990 The difference in business services can be explained only by the existence of holding companies in this sector.
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Within the manufacturing sector, the food and beverage industry is dominated by Austrian-owned firms and chemicals and petroleum and electrical equipment is strongly dominated by indirect FDI. Further we have aggregated an engineering sector which consists of metal products, machinery, electrical, and transport equipment and which accounts for 10 % of total FDI. In this sector indirect FDI is more important than direct FDI.
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The industrial distribution of Austrian investment in CEECs in Table 4 is displayed by the classification of the host country.
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Two very large banks (RZB and Creditanstalt/Bank Austria) are 'market leaders' in CEECs. 4 Indirect FDI will in fact only invest in holding companies by their parent firm which is located somewhere outside Austria and therefore is not be displayed in Table 4 . 
Main characteristics of the survey data
The following analysis covers 150 firms which have engaged in at least one investment in CEECs. 112 of these firms (74.7%) are direct FDI and 38 indirect FDI (25.3%). Since not each firm replied to all questions the number of respondents in tables five to eight is always below the total of 150. differences of regional sales structure for direct and indirect FDI.
Parent Firms
Table 5 presents the regional sales structure of the parent firms. Only 56.3% of total output has been sold on the Austrian market. The largest share of exports (24.5%) was shipped to the EU and another 12.8% to CEEC markets. A comparison of direct and indirect FDI reveals that non-Austrian owned firms display larger export activities than Austrian ones. Their export shares are 49.3% and 42.0% respectively. Indirect FDI exports more to the EU and CEECs alike. However, none of these differences are significant. The impact of FDI on export activities is also reflected by the changes of the regional sales structure.
Diminishing market shares in CEECs point to a substitutive relationship between investments and exports and vice versa. As illustrated by several authors (Bergsten et al. 1978; Lankes and Venables 1996) it might be the case that in the initial stage of investment the vertical integration aspect may dominate and therefore investment will boost exports. In later stages horizontal investment may be more important, leading to a substitutive relationship. Accordingly, we expect rising market shares of CEECs during the initial period of investment and stable or declining market shares in the postinvestment period. Table five to eight present results of independent-samples t-tests which has been calculated to test for the significance of the mean differences between direct and indirect FDI. Before testing the significance of the mean differences a Levene Test has been performed to control for the equality of variances (Norušis 1997, p.231ff.) . Asterisks (***, **, *) indicate significance levels (1, 5 and 10%). The initial investment has been accompanied by a considerable shift of the sales structure (see Table 6 ). On average the parent firms have improved their total export shares by 6.3 percentage-points.
The largest increase has been performed on markets in CEECs (+4.0 percentage-points) but even the EU-market shares have grown (+1.8 percentage-points). Hence, the internationalisation of these firms was not restricted to CEE markets only. Although the share of sales in CEECs improved stronger than those in EU markets, the internationalisation of the sample firms was simultaneous and geographically diversified. Hence, these results show typical patterns of globally acting firms. Moreover, the expected complementary relationship between investments and exports seems to be confirmed. Again, there are no significant differences between direct and indirect FDI. Within the period 1989-95 80% of the firms exhibit growing parent sales, whereas 20% of the sample had declining parent sales. However, a separate analysis of these two groups of firms does not show major differences. Table 7 shows the expected changes of the parent firm's sales structure for the post-investment period 1995-98. Interestingly, the general pattern of the initial period of investment seems to be extended. On average it is expected that the internationalisation process will continue into both directions, Eastern and Western Europe alike. However, for this period there are differences between direct and indirect FDI. Direct FDI show a deeper international division of labour than indirect FDI. The former group improves its export activities to the EU as well as to the CEECs much stronger than indirect FDI. The superior performance is only significant for exports to the EU.
Further, the complementary relationship between investments and exports to the CEECs holds for direct FDI only. This pattern might be an indication that direct FDI still expands further whilst indirect do not.
Affiliates
Next we analyse the sales structure of the affiliates and distinguish between two different motives of investment, i.e. 'efficiency-based' and 'market-driven' FDI. Presumably the first one would indicate that the dominant factor of investment is to get access to a cheap industrial workforce. Such a scenario would presumably substitute exports from the home country and encourage re-imports to the home country. These investments are usually associated with 'relocation'. In contrast, market-driven FDI is mainly accompanied by a considerable expansion of demand in the host country. Such affiliates are mainly self-contained production units rather than a part of an integrated network like efficiency-based FDI. Therefore the production of these affiliates should be sold to a large extent on local markets. These patterns for overall trade are also supported by data on intra-firm trade as published by the Austrian National Bank.
Intra-firm trade
Intra-firm trade (IFT) gives an indication of the role affiliates play in relation to the parent company.
Intra-firm trade patterns are dependent on the various types of investment (market-or efficiency-based FDI), on the sectoral composition of investment and additionally, may change substantially over time (e.g. Braunerhjelm 1998).
In our sample both, direct and indirect FDI, display large IFT surpluses seen from the Austrian perspective. Total IFT surplus increased from ATS 1.2 billion in 1991 to ATS 5.5 billion in 1996, a surplus which is primarily due to indirect FDI. Although indirect FDI accounts only for 26.4% of total capital in 1996 (see Table 3 ) these firms have achieved 51.3% of total intra-firm exports and 35.6% of total intra-firm imports. Hence, these firms realised nearly two thirds of the IFT surplus total. All sectors -except food and beverages and other manufacturing -achieved an IFT surplus. Not surprisingly, the trading sector accounts for the largest share. This surplus has been achieved to a very large extent by indirect FDI. If these exports are accompanied by similar imports to the Austrian firm (which is in fact an affiliate of a foreign MNE), the overall effect on the trade balance need not be positive. Also several other studies have shown that foreign affiliates are more import-dependent than domestic firms (Brenton and DiMauro, 1998; Neudorfer, 1997) , especially when they are marketoriented rather than efficiency-oriented.
IFT is particularly pronounced in the engineering sector, which accounts for one third of total intra-firm exports and 50% of total intra-firm imports. This applies to direct as well as indirect FDI and indicates that the international division of labour is well developed within this sector. In contrast to the IFT patterns of the trading sector, this pattern can be associated with a vertical production structure where intermediate goods are shipped forwards and backwards. Contrary to the expected import surplus, even this efficiency-oriented sector achieved a considerable intra-firm export surplus.
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Summarising, the clear difference of trade and IFT patterns give rise to the assumption that direct and indirect FDI are based on different motives. It should be emphasised that the industry classification is that of the host country, therefore the IFT of the engineering sector does not include a large proportion of finished goods as they would be classified under the industry "trading sector".
IV. Estimation and Results

The explanatory power of the motives for the trade structure of parent and affiliate firms
Previous analysis has demonstrated the predominance of market-driven motives for Austrian FDI in CEECs Winklhofer 1998, Neudorfer 1997) . Efficiency-oriented motives, 'low-wage costs' in particular, are only of minor importance. 9 However, it has been shown that the ranking of efficiency-oriented and market-driven motives is different for particular industries. In the analysis that follows we evaluate the impact of these different motives on the export performance of parent and affiliate firms alike. We expect that market-driven motives improve exports to CEECs by the parent firms whilst the affiliates sell most of their output at local (foreign) markets and export only small amounts to the EU. In contrast, if efficiency-oriented motives dominate, we expect strong exports to the EU by the affiliates and only small exports to CEECs by parent firms.
To test for the impact of different motives on the export performance of parent firms and affiliates we specify the following model: Market-driven motives are among others market potential and proximity to customers whilst efficiency-oriented motives are low wage costs, availability of skilled labour, intermediate inputs and procurement. (1) and (2) are shown in Table 10 . 10 It can be seen that the ranking of the motive 'market potential' indeed increases exports to CEECs of the parent firms whilst 'low-wage costs' decreases exports considerably. The value of the coefficient shows that a one-point higher ranking of the motive 'market potential' improves the export performance of the parent firm by 10.8%-points.
Furthermore, even strategic considerations are of importance for the export performance of the parent firm. All three independent variables are significant. (2) show that these three motives explain export performance only of direct FDI. All coefficients for indirect FDI are of weak significance.11 However, the size of the coefficients ß5 to ß7 shows that the 'market potential' is of much higher importance for indirect FDI than for direct FDI12, while the impact of 'wage costs' and 'strategic considerations' for indirect FDI 10 Questions on motives were of a close-ended variety where the degrees of importance were based on a four-point scale using irrelevant (1), of minor relevance (2), important (3), and very important (4). Results are shown only for selected motives.
Results for equation
11
Certainly, the weak explanatory power of this regression is partly due to the low number of observations for indirect FDI. 12 We have to note that for indirect FDI the impact of 'market potential' on exports can be calculated is considerably smaller. Remarkably, the coefficients for direct FDI remain relatively stable even for specification (2).
To test the explanatory power of these motives for the export performance of the affiliates we have specified the model shown in equation (1) and (2) Results explaining affiliate exports to the EU are encouraging (see Table 11 ), as they are quite well predicted. Again, 'market potential' explains most. A one-point higher ranking of this motive reduces affiliate exports to the EU by 21.2%-points. Also, strategic motives decrease exports to the EU.
In contrast, 'wage costs' increase affiliate exports. However, the quantitative impact of 'wage costs' is much lower than that of 'market potential'.
only by adding the coefficients ß 1 and ß 5 . The same holds for 'wage costs' (adding ß 2 and ß 6 ) and strategic considerations (adding ß 3 and ß 7 ).
As equation (4) in Table 11 demonstrates, the general explanation above can be confirmed for direct FDI only. However, a thorough interpretation of the coefficients shows again that for indirect FDI a one-point higher rating of the motive 'market potential' decreases exports to the EU much stronger than for direct FDI (see footnote 13). In contrast to this important difference the impact of strategic considerations and 'wage costs' on exports to the EU for indirect FDI is negligible.
Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that the significance level of all three coefficients (ß5 to ß7) is rather low.
To summarise these different explanations of parent and affiliate exports we conclude that the export performance of direct FDI is strongly explained by market-driven motives, and 'wage costs' and strategic motives provide additional explanations, while for indirect FDI only 'market potential' explains the export performance of the affiliates.
Impact of parent and affiliate sales on domestic employment
Next, we look at the impact of affiliate sales on domestic employment. For that purpose we have chosen a simple descriptive model (see Blomström et al., 1997) . Such an approach tries to evaluate the relationship between foreign sales and domestic employment for a given level of parent sales.
We have tested the following relationship:
where parent employment (PE) is explained by parent sales (PS) and affiliate sales (AS) alike.
Since from our theoretical discussion above we expect different effects of direct and indirect FDI, we test for differences with a new specification of Equation 5 The results for equation (5) and (6) 
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Due to the crudeness of this relationship a cautious interpretation of this result is appropriate. However, it seems to be the case that larger foreign affiliate production is associated with an allocation of labour-intensive value added stages of production to foreign countries whilst capitalintensive production is performed at home. Although such a scenario is associated with a relocation of labour, such FDI are efficiency enhancing and therefore improve the overall competitiveness of the MNE.
However, a separate evaluation of this relationship for direct and indirect FDI shows considerable differences. 14 (cf. Equ. 6) First, parent firms of indirect FDI are in general much smaller than parent firms of direct FDI. Second, parent sales of indirect FDI are much more labour-intensive than parent sales of direct FDI. Regarding the effect of parent sales on parent employment for indirect 13 However, the difference of these two coefficients is mainly due to different labour-output relations between Austria and the CEECs. 
Aspects of the internal division of labour
The results of this analysis indicate that direct FDI is more of an efficiency-type than indirect FDI. It suggests that direct FDI has stronger direct linkages between the activities of the parent firm and its affiliates in CEECs. Indeed, we are able to show empirically that firms of the direct FDI-type have improved domestic and foreign employment simultaneously by improving their internal division of labour. This is mainly due to the fact that Austrian investors in CEECs include many small and medium-sized firms, which actively started to restructure their activities via FDI in adjacent countries after 1989. Geographical proximity is a driver of FDI (Martin and Velazquez 1997; Holland and Pain, 1998) , reflected here in the relatively deeper integration of Austrian firms when compared to other MNEs. Proximity is expressed in such terms as easier market entry, prior information, lower transport costs. Moreover, local market shares of indirect FDI are higher than of direct FDI. In addition, (re-) exports to Austria from direct FDI are higher than from indirect FDI.
Our regression analysis underpins this pattern by distinguishing between direct and indirect FDI. We explain exports to CEECs by the parent firm as well as exports to the EU by their affiliates by different motives for FDI, namely market-driven, strategic and efficiency-oriented. The results reveal that direct investment can be much better explained by these motives (i.e. they are statistically significant) than indirect FDI (where motives, except the market motive, lack statistical significance).
We explain this difference by the different linkages between parent firms and affiliates of direct and indirect FDI.
In Austria, most affiliates of foreign MNEs were based on market seeking motives (see Table   13 ). The underlying structure of the motives indicates that the parents use their Austrian affiliate in particular for sales-related activities not only in Austria, but also in CEECs, utilising their specific market know-how. This is consistent with Porter's explanation (1990, p. 47) , that "early movers gain advantages such as being first to reap economies of scale, reducing costs through cumulative learning, establishing brand names abroad and customer relationships without direct competition, getting their pick of distribution channels, and obtaining the best locations for facilities or the best sources of raw material or other inputs." The changes in CEECs after 1989 created unique opportunities for foreign parent firms to enter CEECs markets through their Austrian affiliate.
In CEECs, Austrian MNEs intensified their international division of labour over time and moved from sales to production. The foreign MNEs located in Austria did not follow this sequence. This does, however, not imply that both groups' activities in CEECs will differ, as the latter group organises their strategic and efficiency-oriented FDI not via their Austrian affiliate.
V. Discussion and Conclusions
The paper started from a few stylised facts on Austrian FDI in CEECs. At first glance, the descriptive results presented here seemed to contradict the stylised facts as presented in the introductory section about the relatively better employment performance of Austrian-owned firms.
Further investigation led to the conclusion that the sales and trade structure derived from the underlying motives of FDI provide a consistent picture of direct and indirect FDI. In particular, the underlying ownership structure of foreign investors seems to be an important determinant of employment effects of outward FDI on home countries. The results of this analysis confirm that direct FDI is more of an efficiency-type than indirect FDI. 17 We have found that FDI in CEECs by direct and indirect investors are motivated by different factors. Foreign-owned firms (indirect FDI) use their Austrian affiliates as bridgeheads and engage primarily in market-oriented FDI in CEECs. The fact that a large wage gap still exists, suggests that direct FDI engages in a re-allocation of labour-intensive activities to CEECs. The additional fixed costs in production relocation are thus partly balanced by lower variable costs. In addition, it is most likely, that the Austrian firm enjoys cost advantages vis-à-vis local firms deriving from higher productive efficiency which improves the position in the local market. Both factors contribute to sustainable competitive advantage at home, resulting in an overall (net) increase in domestic employment. This is reflected by the superior development of domestic sales and employment of direct FDI shown above.
Direct FDI has much stronger trade linkages between the parent firm and its affiliates in CEECs.
Generally, it seems to be that firms of the direct FDI-type have improved domestic and foreign employment simultaneously by improving their internal division of labour internationally.
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The results derived here on an aggregated level also bear some micro-economic logic as argued in studies about the division of labour between parent and affiliates, and the autonomy of affiliates in particular. Such studies take the value-added chain as a starting point. The number, importance and quality of the activity of an affiliate within the internal division of labour of the MNC determines the degree of autonomy and inter alia whether the affiliate itself engages in affiliates in foreign countries (indirect FDI). The affiliates' activities range from simple assembly operations to World Mandate status. Young, Hood and Peters (1994) describe "developmental affiliates" as firms which are able to combine their competitive advantage (provided by the parent) and indigenous resources in a unique way. The market know-how of Eastern Europe from prior exporting is such a factor which in combination with the product or service results in a unique position of the Austrian affiliate within the whole group of the MNE.
From the viewpoint of a national economy, the basic difference between direct and indirect 17 However, these results portray "an average" investor, as of course, both groups of firms engage in more than one type of FDI, based on more than one exclusive motive.
Case study evidence presented in supports this conclusion.
FDI is related to the aspect of the locus of decision making (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995; Dunning 1990 ). Sometimes, a "metropolitan -hinterland" relationship is suggested, where the headquarter is responsible for the strategy, the affiliate for operational sales targets. The trade structure of the Austrian headquarter and her FDI compared to the foreign affiliate in Austria and her FDI resembles this type of relationship. In particular, the Austrian affiliate can be used by the foreign parent for transit trade to her affiliate in the CEEC (indirect FDI). Where substantial business decisions are concerned, MNEs seem to manage their foreign affiliates on a very short leash. This may affect production activities of foreign MNEs in CEECs which are not organised via their Austrian affiliate, but directly from the parent abroad (see right dashed arrow in Figure 1) .
The evidence about a change in the effect over time (i.e. a shift from the left-hand dashed arrow to the right-hand dashed arrow in Figure 1 ) presented here is also consistent with evidence published by the Austrian National bank (see Table 3 above). A possible explanation is that the specific experience of the affiliate located in Austria has been lost towards the affiliate in CEECs and that HQs outside Austria have already built up their own CEEC-competence. Moreover "Austrian FDI in the CEECs has become controlled more and more by Austrian firms." (Neudorfer 1997, p . 57) Indirect FDI nevertheless remain an important determinant of the domestic employment effect of Austrian FDI in CEECs. Also, our survey included a question on the future strategies of investors in CEECs and although the plans of firms need not materialise in praxi, the answers point to the same direction.
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To summarise, the paper provides evidence, that a division between different types of investors sheds new light on the question of production relocation. In particular, the specific argument used here, is that the employment effect depends not only on the amount of FDI, but also on the ownership structure of investors.
The plausibility of the aggregated results on the micro-economic level also lead to the conclusion that the relocation of parts of the value-chain of firms and its positive effects on domestic employment and the overall competitiveness of the remaining domestic value-added stages could be actively supported by selective policy measures like the provision of information on host countries.
Fears of welfare loss of the developed region when integrating with a less developed region seem to be unjustified, concerning trade and FDI relationships. On the contrary, the evidence points to positive employment effects at home.
Other results of our survey show a relatively higher share of direct FDI who intend to engage in "production" in the future, while the ratio is much lower for indirect investors. On the other hand, an expansion of "distribution and services" is intended by a higher number of indirect FDI than of direct FDI. 
